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THEOLOGY AND THE PERSONAL.
In selecting a topic for this inaugural lecture I have not 
chosen any specific problems which fall within the province of 
theological science. I have chosen rather to discuss a matter 
which belongs to the border area between theology and philo­
sophy, and, in particular, I have chosen the question of the 
personal, because it is in relation to this subject, as I see it, that 
modern thinking has most conspicuously failed—and the re­
actionary social movements of modern times, which violate the 
character of the personal, are not unconnected with this in­
tellectual failure. In concentrating attention upon the personal 
I am not of course approaching an exclusively theological topic, 
but it is one, I would unreservedly maintain, in which theology 
has its own inalienable interest. My subject then is ‘Theology 
and the Personal’, and in the course of my argument I shall be 
defending three propositions, that modern thinking since the 
scientific revolution of the seventeenth century has largely failed 
to take account of the personal, that at the present time there are 
welcome signs that this defect is being remedied, and that 
theology is greatly concerned in this matter and has its own 
peculiar contribution to make to it.
Thomas Hobbes is not generally reckoned to stand in the 
first rank of philosophers. To many students of the subject his 
name is chiefly, if not exclusively, associated with the thorough­
going egoism of his ethical views. And yet, whatever be his 
deficiencies as a philosopher, he had this great merit that right at 
the beginning of the modern period he outlined a system of 
philosophy which in one form or another has exercised a curious 
attraction upon the modern mind, a system of philosophy which 
conceives of the universe as explicable, ultimately, in severely 
mechanistic, materialistic, deterministic and therefore imper­
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sonal terms. According to Hobbes everything was to be under­
stood in terms of matter and motion, the world around us, man 
himself, his actions and his inmost thoughts, and although his 
elaboration of this theme is hardly a brilliant piece of philo­
sophical argument, it is significant because it provides an early 
rough delineation of a position to which, for some people, 
modern thought seems inescapably committed. It is quite true, 
as Prof. W. T. Stace has recently said1, that “Hobbes was not a 
great philosopher. But he was the philosophical mirror of the 
new science of his time. His philosophy is simply the 
generalization of the tendencies of the new science. Whatever 
appears in Galileo as a truth limited to the particular area of 
physics reappears in Hobbes as a universal truth about the whole 
cosmos.” And yet, I think, Hobbes is even more significant than 
that statement would suggest, for one very curious thing about 
him is that, although he was described by a contemporary as 
“that father of atheists”, in fact he reserved in his completed 
system of thought a place for God and His kingdom. “Whether 
men will or not,” he says2, “they must be subject always to the 
Divine Power. By denying the Existence, or Providence of God, 
men may shake off their Ease, but not their Yoke.” He has 
even a principle which enables him to deal effectively with any 
apparent contradiction of this truth, “for though,” he tells us3, 
“there be many things in God’s Word above Reason; that is to 
say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or 
confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seemeth 
so, the fault is either in our unskillful Interpretation, or erroneous 
Ratiocination.” In all this Hobbes may be hopelessly in­
consistent with his fundamental contention, with the thorough­
going materialism which is the basic principle of his thought; but 
even when he is thus inconsistent he is no less characteristic of 
the modern conciousness, driven as it is more and more towards 
a materialistic or, at any rate, an impersonal philosophy, and yet 
loath as it also is to surrender what is left to it of religious faith 
and spiritual insight. Hobbes is characteristic, I suggest, of the 
modern consciousness even in its radical confusion and per­
plexity, and he is in some ways the philosophical mirror, not 
only of its science, but of its total experience of life. To some 
of course that apparently incompatible but persistently lingering 
faith is one of the last relics of an unscientific and superstitious 
age, while to others it is the remnant of a sanity which has been 
temporarily lost; and the progress of my argument will, I hope, 
have some bearing on the question which of these two estimates 
happens to be true.
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Hobbes of course lived and worked in the seventeenth 
century, and in the three hundred years that have intervened 
vast changes have been wrought in the scientific understanding 
of the world. In the lifetime of Hobbes modern science was 
only in its infancy, but nowadays the child has grown up and 
taken possession of the home. My concern, however, is not 
with the great scientific changes which have undoubtedly taken 
place, but rather with what has remained remarkably constant, 
the general framework which science is sometimes thought to 
provide for itself, the philosophical outlook to which it is fre­
quently supposed to lead, that is, materialism, or, more signifi­
cantly, as I think, impersonalism. As a scientist Hobbes would 
be out of place in the modern scene, but as a philosopher he 
would not find it very difficult, I imagine, to pick up the threads 
and to make himself at home. For by and large, as a rough 
generalisation, it may be said with some truth that the last three 
hundred years of philosophical thought have witnessed a develop­
ing strain of materialism, or, at any rate of impersonalism, 
broken from time to time, interrupted here and there by efforts 
on the part of the philosophical mind to explore more or less 
disconnected alternatives to it. What continuity of thought there 
is seems to lie with materialism, and yet the modern mind, like 
that of Hobbes, has never completely capitulated to it. Perhaps 
no one has given more striking expression to this outlook than 
Mr. Bertrand Russell in his famous essay entitled “A Free Man’s 
Worship” which he published in the early years of the present 
century. Let me recall some of the things he then said. “That 
man is the product,” he declared1, “of causes which had no 
prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his 
growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but 
the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no 
heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling can preserve an 
individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, 
all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness 
of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of 
the solar system, and that the whole temple of man’s achievement 
must inevitably be buried beneath the debris of a universe in 
ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so 
nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope 
to stand . . . .  Brief and powerless is Man’s life; on him and all 
his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark.” It is true 
that like Hobbes before him Mr. Russell still found room for 
worship, for religion, but it was religion now without God, for 
omnipotent matter leaves no room for God. This, you may 
think, is a very odd type of religion. As one commentator has
1M ysticism  and L ogic, 47f. a n d  56.
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expressed it1 in discussing Mr. Russell’s views, “we must ask 
nothing of the universe but must accept it as it is and try to love 
it and worship it as it is, however fundamentally rotten it may 
reveal itself to be.” In comparison with almost any of the 
historical forms of religion this is certainly a most impoverished 
version; but attenuated as it is, it is difficult to reconcile with the 
thorough-going materialism of Mr. Russell’s essay. If mere 
matter is omnipotent why should we try to love it? Why on 
earth should we offer it our worship? And yet this combination 
of incompatibles, this curious combination of an impersonal 
philosophy with some relic of religion, is profoundly characteris­
tic of the modern mind.
So far I have spoken of this philosophical outlook which 
seems peculiarly appropriate, or at any rate peculiarly attractive, 
to the modern period, sometimes as materialism, sometimes as an 
impersonal philosophy; and I proceed now to maintain that what 
is really significant about it is not its materialism but its im- 
personalism, not what it affirms but what it ignores and excludes, 
namely the personal. There seem to me to be two ways in 
which this thesis may be elaborated and defended, and I wish to 
invite your attention to these in turn.
In the first place, it is necessary to recognise the fact that 
characteristically modern philosophy, and by that I mean 
scientifically inspired philosophy—not science but scientifically 
inspired philosophy—has not always professed to tell us what is 
the ultimate character of the universe; and in a special degree is 
that true of contemporary philosophy. It does not try to 
characterise the universe in which we live. Its main interest is 
to indicate the limits of human thought and knowledge. It does 
not tell us any longer that there is no such being as God, that 
reality has no room for Him; but it does maintain that the state­
ment that God exists has no meaning, is literally nonsense, be­
cause it cannot be empirically verified.
Empirical verifiability is put forward as the criterion 
of meaningfulness, although the principle of empirical 
verifiability is not itself empirically verifiable. Modern philo­
sophy, or that important and most influential part of it which 
finds its inspiration in the work of the empirical sciences, is no 
longer concerned to provide us with a picture of the universe as 
a totality, but, in the words of one significant thinker, “to draw 
a limit to thinking.” “Or rather,” he adds,2 “not to thinking but 
to the expression of thoughts; for, in order to draw a limit to 
thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this 
limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot
1B a illie , The In terp reta tion  o f  R elig ion , 324.
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be thought). The limit can, therefore, only be drawn in 
language and what lies on the other side of the limit will be 
simply nonsense.” This of course is not materialism. It is 
empiricism and, in fact, radical empiricism. But it is still what 
I have called impersonalism. Indeed it is radical impersonalism, 
for not only is the belief in God set aside as altogether meaning­
less, but on this view also there is no adequate place for our 
knowledge of other persons. Just as Christianity links God and 
my neighbour in the commandment of love so this strand of 
modern philosophy links God and my neighbour in its radically 
negative verdict of nonsense. It is not only the word ‘God’ that 
is meaningless, it is also the words ‘you’ and ‘thou’. The writer, 
from whom I have already quoted, has even declared that “what 
solipsism means, is quite correct, only it cannot be said, but it 
shows itself.”1 Solipsism, I should have thought, is not a 
welcome implication of any theory but clear evidence of its 
absurdity; and the curious thing is that Wittgenstein did not 
make this statement to himself. He made it in a book which 
others presumably were intended to read, to which Mr. Russell 
contributed an introduction. Perhaps his solipsism was a special 
kind of solipsism, a modified solipsism according to which only 
he and Mr. Russell existed. In the Preface he says that the 
object of his book “would be attained if there were one person 
who read it with understanding and to whom it afforded 
pleasure”, but even that would be one too many for his solipsism, 
and I imagine that his publishers hoped for many more than one. 
But this element of solipsism is not to be lightly dismissed, how­
ever difficult it is to maintain it consistently. It does show itself 
— by the inescapable logic of this way of thinking. It is the 
final, rigidly logical outcome of scientifically inspired philosophy.
The other way in which I wish to elaborate and defend my 
thesis that what is significant about scientifically inspired philo­
sophy is not its materialism but its impersonalism, involves a 
reference to the work of Immanuel Kant, for it seems to me 
clear that Kant’s philosophy represents the nearest approach to 
an adequate alternative to this other type of philosophy which in 
one form or another has again and again appealed to the modern 
mind, and that Kant’s philosophy is thus partially successful in 
so far as it provides an alternative not to materialism but to im­
personalism. If we think of scientifically inspired philosophy as 
materialism we are almost bound to look for an alternative to it 
in some form of idealism. Immanuel Kant was also to some 
extent an idealist, but it was his idealism, as represented by his 
distinction between appearance and reality, which constituted 
the fundamental weakness of his position. His strength, on the
‘Ibid., 161.
other hand, lay in his rejection of impersonalism. Indeed in the 
thought of Immanuel Kant there are to be found all the elements 
of an adequate alternative to the impersonal philosophy which 
has so much characterised the modem period and which has 
found its inspiration in the rapidly expanding achievements of 
modern science. In the first place, scientific knowledge itself is 
given a secure place in Kant’s system, and it seems clear that 
no philosophy which fails to provide such a place can ever again 
be deemed satisfactory. But, secondly, the limits of this know­
ledge are clearly indicated, and the problem of defining such 
limits is certainly one of the underlying problems of modern 
thought. Whether it be a finally defensible theory or not, Kant 
has a theory concerning the limits of scientific knowledge, and 
no philosophy which lacks such a theory can claim to be 
adequate. Thirdly, he quite firmly places this knowledge within 
the context of a system of personal relationships. This is what 
he means by his important principle of the Primacy of the 
Practical. In other words Kant would have agreed with Bishop 
Butler when he said that the moral is the real, and for Kant the 
ultimate principle of morality was respect for persons. “So act,” 
he said, “as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in 
that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means 
only.”1 As we follow the course of Kant’s moral argument we 
find it leading to the establishment of a certain concept, the idea 
of a kingdom of ends, which is the idea of what I have called a 
system of personal relationships. In the fourth place, Kant’s 
philosophy affirms the religious realm. No serious student of 
religion will be prepared to accept Kant’s account of religion as 
in any way adequate, for within the system of his thought 
religion amounts to little more than a belief in three objects, 
God, freedom and immortality, and appears into the bargain as 
an offshoot of morality, as a mere appendix to morality. There 
is no doubt that while the religious realm is recognised and 
clearly affirmed the centre of gravity remains in the sphere of 
morality; but even so it is a substantial gain to have the place of 
religion acknowledged. And I suggest that when Kant’s philo­
sophy is considered as a whole it is found to contain all the 
elements of an adequate alternative to impersonalism, and it 
offers the first rough sketch of a modern synthesis which is fit to 
take the place of the old medieval synthesis of reason and 
revelation worked out in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
by Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas, and which may 
certainly be judged philosophically sounder than the uneasy con­
sortium of scientifically inspired philosophy and religion that we
’G rundlegung, t r a n s .  b y  A b b o tt, K an t’s Theory o f  E th ics, 47.
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find in Thomas Hobbes, in some measure in Mr. Bertrand 
Russell, and even in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein who in the 
final stages of his argument threw away the empirical ladder on 
which he had climbed and emerged—or perhaps we should say, 
merged—into the mystical. “Whereof one cannot speak,” he 
says, “thereof one must be silent”; and on that note his remark­
able book comes to an end. But it seems to me clear that the 
integrated system of thought provided by Immanuel Kant is 
philosophically sounder than any such uneasy alliance of 
scientifically inspired philosophy and some relic of religion, 
which is after all in the last analysis a combination of 
incompatibles.
I wish, however, to go much further than that and to main­
tain that a philosophy such as Kant’s, which is not only an 
integrated but also a comprehensive system of thought, is 
superior to what I have called scientifically inspired philosophy 
or the philosophy of impersonalism, even when the latter has in 
the interests of consistency shed the last vestige of a religious 
outlook, as it is tending to do at the present time. At this point, 
however, we must be quite clear in our minds that science or the 
sciences are one thing and scientifically inspired philosophy is 
quite another. It is not the function of science to do justice to 
the personal in our total experience of life and the world; but 
equally it is not the function of philosophy, it is not the function, 
at any rate, of a sound philosophy to be misled by science and to 
exclude the personal not just from our scientific outlook but 
from our total outlook. As scientists we must, for the purposes 
of science, exclude the personal, but when we become philoso­
phers and work out our ultimate outlook on reality as a whole 
we must re-affirm the personal or else fall into error in holding 
to a one-sided and radically defective philosophy. And yet it 
is precisely into that error that scientifically inspired philosophy 
has fallen in the modern period. I have already quoted Prof. 
Stace’s remark that “whatever appears in Galileo as a truth 
limited to the particular area of physics reappears in Hobbes as a 
universal truth about the whole cosmos”, and it is precisely in 
making that transition that philosophy falls into error. It is not 
simply that in making it philosophy is engaged upon a perilous 
generalisation, for perilous generalisations may turn out to be 
true. It is rather that in making such a generalisation philosophy 
misunderstands what science has done. Science in the course of 
its proper task makes, and must make, an abstraction from the 
real world in which the scientist lives. It sets aside and ignores 
many aspects of reality which do not interest it, and amongst 
these is the personal aspect of reality, the fact that in the real 
world persons confront one another in a system of personal 
relationships. Quite properly science ignores and abstracts from
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this aspect of reality; but quite wrongly scientifically inspired 
philosophy, whether it be materialism or radical empiricism, 
transforms this methodological abstraction into a permanent 
limitation; and, clearly, in doing so it is not simply making a 
perilous generalisation which may after all turn out by chance 
to be true, but is instead queering its own pitch from the start, 
crippling itself from the beginning in the performance of its 
appropriate task. The abstractions of science are a legitimate 
and indispensable part of its method, just as a diver’s suit is a 
legitimate device for the accomplishment of his special sub­
marine task; but when the philosopher turns these legitimate 
abstractions of science into permanent limitations of human 
thinking he is acting much as a diver would who thought that 
he might as well eat, drink and be merry, in fact spend the rest 
of his life, in his working clothes. In other words, impersonalism 
in philosophy, characteristic though it may be of the modern 
period, is not an hypothesis which may eventually turn out to be 
true but is a mistaken and seriously inadequate analysis of our 
total human situation; and for that reason the late Archbishop 
Temple was perfectly justified when in his Gifford Lectures he 
complained that modern thought was vitiated by its involvement 
in what has been called the ego-centric predicament and declared 
that if he were asked what was the most disastrous moment in 
the history of Europe he would be strongly tempted to answer 
that it was that period of leisure when the father of modern 
philosophy, Rene Descartes, having no claims to meet, re­
mained for a whole day “shut up alone in a stpve”, and evolved 
his famous argument, Cogito ergo sum.' It is true that the 
ego-centric predicament as there understood by Temple consists 
in the isolation of the self from what is not the self, the world of 
objects which confronts it, and accordingly commits philosophy 
to the impossible task of building up an adequate account of 
reality as a whole from that meagre foundation; but even when 
this mistaken and artificial isolation of the self from a world of 
objects is deliberately transcended, the ego-centric predicament 
remains in what has turned out to be its most crippling form, name­
ly the isolation of the self from other selves, from the system of 
personal relationships in which all life is lived and all thinking 
thought. But if characteristically modern thinking is entangled 
in this ego-centric predicament it is clear that it presents us, not 
with a perilous generalisation which may or may not turn out to 
be true, but rather with a radically faulty analysis, as if (he 
philosophy of impersonalism had taken from the start a wrong 
turning and had set its course upon a path on which it was
*Cf. N atu re , M an and God, 57ff.
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inevitable that sooner or later, not only the existence of God, 
but the existence of my neighbour, would be called in question.
What I have said by way of criticism does not of course 
mean that there is no truth in the philosophy of impersonalism, 
but it does imply that what truth it contains is truth abstracted 
and divorced from reality; and when truth is divorced from 
reality, reality cannot be reached by simply multiplying truth. In 
other words, there is no escape from the ego-centric predicament 
simply by thinking. As Principal John Baillie has put it1, “the only 
way to get out of the ego-centric predicament is never to get into 
it.” What is required, that is to say, is a fresh start; and there 
is encouraging evidence of just that in contemporary thought.
I refer at this point not so much to a new movement of 
thought as to a new emphasis in thought, something more funda­
mental than a new movement, which is to be found in various 
movements not always in complete harmony one with another. 
The thinkers whom 1 have in mind are not readily to be classified 
as belonging to a single school, and yet it is a remarkable fact 
that in their different ways they have disclosed the same new 
horizon to the philosophical mind. They have in fact in their 
different ways contrived to transcend the ego-centric predicament 
and to introduce the personal dimension into philosophical 
thought. Perhaps the most characteristic is one of the earliest, 
Dr. Martin Buber, whose little book /  and Thou was published in 
1923. There the personal context of life and thought is clearly 
affirmed. “I become through my relation to the T h o u ," he says1, 
“as I become 1, I say Thou. All real living is meeting.” In 
other words, the relation of a subject to a world of objects which 
from his superior perspective the subject can observe, investigate 
and put under the microscope, is an unreal situation gained by 
deliberate abstraction from the real situation in which subject 
confronts subject and communication takes place through the 
medium of a shared world of objects. The emphasis upon the 
personal dimension which the sciences must and do legitimately 
exclude but which philosophy and all ultimate thinking can only 
ignore at its own peril, is to be found also in the philosophical 
movement of existentialism which, in the years between the Wars 
and in the post-War period, has so enlivened philosophical dis­
cussion on the continent of Europe, in striking contrast to the 
situation in England—and by England in this connection I do 
not mean Scotland—in striking contrast to the situation in 
England where radical empiricism has very largely prevailed, 
where in post-War Oxford Prof. A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth
1Our K n ow led ge o f  God, 152.
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and Logic has in the words of one writer achieved something of 
the status of a philosophical Bible2, and where accordingly truth 
has been eagerly pursued in divorce from reality. It would be 
beside the point to discuss this movement of existentialism at 
any length, its various forms and its undoubted extravagances. 
What is important for the present argument is that in its very 
starting-point it deliberately transcends the ego-centric predica­
ment. “Consciousness,” says M. Marcel in his Gifford Lectures3, 
“is above all consciousness of something which is other than 
itself, what we call self-consciousness being on the contrary a 
derivative act whose essential nature is, indeed, rather uncertain.” 
And later he roundly declares4 that “in its own intrinsic 
structure subjectivity is already, and in the most profound sense, 
inter-subjective.” Let me repeat that word ‘intersubjective’, a 
new word in the philosophical vocabulary but a new word which 
heralds a new world. It is indeed this emphasis upon what 
existentialists call intersubjectivity that not only strikes a refresh­
ingly new note in modern philosophical thought but also opens 
up the possibility of decisively transcending the ego-centric 
predicament in all its forms and of doing intellectual justice at 
last to the personal and the system of personal relationships in 
which all thought takes place. After long delay it begins to look 
as if the modern period might find its own successor to the 
medieval synthesis and so acquire a settled and comprehensive 
intellectual framework for its varied life and experience.
If the argument so far is sound it means that any adequate 
philosophical outlook must be so broadly based, so largely con­
ceived, that it comprehends the two kinds of relationship in 
which we stand, our relationship to a world of objects and our 
relationship, no less direct and no less ultimate, to a world of 
subjects. Dr. Buber seems perfectly right when he maintains 
that “to man the world is twofold” and that accordingly man has 
what Dr. Buber calls two primary words which he speaks, I—It 
and I—Thou; and yet for long the second of these has gone un­
recognised or at any rate has been uncritically assimilated to 
the former. It is one of the curious facts concerning the history 
of philosophy that for such a long time it has been unable to 
provide any adequate account of our knowledge of other selves, 
our knowledge of subjects as distinct from objects, our know­
ledge, that is to say, of persons. In the past it has been assumed 
either that our knowledge of other selves is just a special case of 
our knowledge of objects, in other words, that other persons are 
simply the bodies that we observe and nothing more, or else that
1 I and Thou (E n g . t r a n s . ) ,  11. 2Cf. J o a d ’s A  C ritique o f L og ica l P os itiv ism , 9.
3The M ystery  o f  B e in g , I , 52. 4Ibid ., I , 182f.
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it is an indirect and inferential knowledge, in which, having 
observed bodies like our own, we infer the existence of minds or 
selves like ours. But theories like these cannot for long with­
stand any serious criticism and are generally advanced in the 
interests of some broader theory which finds its real strength 
elsewhere but which can give no account of our knowledge of 
other people except along one or other of the two lines I have 
just indicated. Subjects or persons are not just a special class of 
objects or else we should not be gathered here this evening and 
engaged upon this discussion; and as for the inferential theory I 
find it incredible to suppose that a man may fall in love and even 
propose marriage with the conclusion of one of his own 
inferences. It is important to notice, however, that the inferen­
tial theory only appears absurd when we have come clearly to 
recognise the twofold character of man’s world, in Dr. Buber’s 
terminology, the difference between the two primary words which 
he speaks. So long as in our thinking we do not distinguish 
between a world of objects and a world of subjects, so long, in 
other words, as in our thinking we are involved in the ego­
centric predicament, something like the inferential theory is the 
only account open to us of our knowledge of other persons. We 
have already closed the door to any adequate account of the 
matter by confining ourselves in the presuppositions of our 
thought to what is essentially our world and no one else’s, to the 
ego-centric predicament, and by converting this necessary 
abstraction of science into a permanent limitation of our philo­
sophical and ultimate outlook.
Now in exactly the same way, when fifty years ago Mr. 
Bertrand Russell came to his pessimistic conclusion that man’s 
“origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, 
are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms”, and 
that “on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless 
and dark”, the outcome of his thinking was largely determined 
for him by his inadequate presuppositions, by his uncritical 
assumption that he was confronted, not by the twofold world of 
real life, but by a single uniform world of objects. Even if he 
did not realise it he was not talking about real men and women, 
beings who are essentially subjects or persons. He was talking 
instead about a rather curious abstraction, man the object and 
not the subject—it is upon him that the slow, sure doom falls 
pitiless and dark, but since he does not exist it will scarcely 
trouble him. In the very act of making that abstraction, in 
converting the subject into a mere object, Mr. Russell had 
already shot the man he was going to sentence to be hanged.
Precisely similar considerations apply to Mr. Fred Hoyle’s 
more recent but no less curious excursion into the philosophical 
and religious realm towards the end of his otherwise illuminating
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discussion entitled The Nature of the Universe. “Why is the 
Universe as it is and not something else?” he asks, “Why is the 
Universe here at all?” “It is true,” he replies, “that at present 
we have no clue to the answers to questions such as these, and it 
may be that the materialists are right in saying that no meaning 
can be attached to them.” Whether any meaning can be attached 
to them or not, however, Mr. Hoyle continues to ask them; and 
indeed of one thing at any rate he is quite certain. That is that 
there is just no answer in the Hebrew-Christian tradition. “Is 
it in any way reasonable to suppose,” he naively asks, “that it 
was given to the Hebrews to understand mysteries far deeper 
than anything I can comprehend, when it is quite clear that they 
were completely ignorant of many matters that seem common­
place to me?”1 This of course is no new attitude of the human 
mind. Christianity has understood it perfectly from the very 
earliest times. St. Paul was thinking of it when he wrote to the 
Corinthians the well-known words, “Unto the Jews a stumbling- 
block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which 
are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and 
the wisdom of God.” But what concerns me here is not the 
ultimate attitude of mind but the intellectual defence and disguise 
of it; and here the truth is, in philosophical terms, that Mr. Hoyle, 
having got into the abstract situation demanded by his science, 
in which a subject is confronted merely by a world of objects, 
has been unable to get out of it, has been unable to shake him­
self free from it. Instead he has unwittingly turned it into an 
ego-centric predicament and is therefore hoist with his own 
scientific petard. In that plight it simply could not occur to 
him that the children of Israel, for example, occupied on ultimate 
issues a superior standpoint to his own, because their whole life 
was firmly embedded in the intersubjective situation which is 
after all the real situation and from which the scientific situation 
is only a necessary and temporary abstraction.
So far I have been mainly concerned with the negative im­
plications of the recognition of intersubjectivity, but something 
must now be said on the positive side. Confrontation by a sub­
ject is something quite different from confrontation by an object. 
In knowing here I am also known. I am faced by another centre 
of consciousness and action. In making demands upon it I must 
acknowledge its claims upon me—although ‘it’ of course is not 
the right word. It represents another point of view alongside 
my own from which the world of objects can be observed. It 
demands incessantly what no object can ever demand, my 
respect. It is another T  over against me and not just an object
’Op. C it., p.115.
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of my thought. For certain limited purposes I can treat 
subjects as if they were only objects, but in doing so I am auto­
matically excluding what is distinctive of them, namely that 
they are not objects at all but other subjects or persons just as 
I am. By observation I can learn certain things about them, but 
even if in this way I came to know everything about them I still 
would not know them as they really are, that is, as subjects. 
“What then,” asks Dr. Buber1, “do we know of Thou?” “Just 
everything,” he replies, “for we know nothing isolated about it 
any more.” It seems to me evident that our knowledge about 
persons, gained by treating them as objects, contributes to our 
knowledge of them as subjects, and, if Dr. Buber intends to deny 
that, I think that he is wrong; but even so it remains true that our 
knowledge of subjects can never be reduced to any amount of 
knowledge about them. To know a person, to be confronted by 
a person, is a unique experience which cannot be reduced to a 
special case of being confronted by objects. If an authoritative 
statement of scientifically inspired philosophy, emanating from 
the Viennese Circle of philosophers, is right in affirming as it 
does that “in science there are no depths, all is on the surface”2, 
it must also be affirmed that science is not co-extensive with 
reality, that in reality there are depths, where “deep calleth unto 
deep”, where subject confronts subject and persons communicate 
one with another.
Now much of the most fruitful thinking in this direction has 
been done by theologians or by theologically minded philoso­
phers, and it seems to me quite clear that theology has an in­
alienable interest in the development of an adequate philosophy 
along these lines and in making its own contribution to it. It is 
certainly not the primary function of theology to make that 
contribution. The fundamental task of Christian theology is to 
give a critical and systematic account of Christian faith; but 
when the primacy of that task has been amply acknowledged it 
is only an arbitrary restriction which prevents theological 
thought from critically examining the philosophical problems of 
the day and from making to their solution its own appropriate 
contribution. Unfortunately in contemporary theology there is 
a tendency to make this arbitrary restriction, in technical theo­
logical language, to deny the legitimacy of apologetics as a 
branch of theology alongside dogmatics; and this tendency is 
doubly unfortunate for it proceeds from that very important and 
influential school of theological thought, Barthianism, which has 
a quite distinctive contribution to make to this matter.
It is now thirty-five years since Dr. Karl Barth’s comment­
ary on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans burst like a thunder­
storm upon the theological world and since then, by the very
’I an d  Thou, 11. 2M. B la c k ’s In tro d u c tio n  to  C a rn a p , The U n ity  o f  S cience, 10.
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power of his thought, Dr. Barth has compelled theology to a very 
large extent to state its position in relation to himself, agreeing 
with him or else disagreeing. In the early days there was some 
uncertainty concerning a suitable name for this new and striking 
theological movement, but gradually theologians came to agree 
in calling it “The Theology of the Word of God”, and perhaps 
no title could be more appropriate than that one. Its signifi­
cance lies in this, that for Dr. Barth the quite central fact in 
theology is the revelation of God, the personal revelation of the 
one living and true God, the Word which God speaks, which is 
certainly closely connected with the Word of God in the Bible 
but which is not to be outrightly identified with it since the word 
of revelation is a living personal word, the word of One who is 
a subject, in fact the supreme and sovereign subject, whose word 
therefore is not to be contemplated as if it were merely an object 
before man’s mind, whose word indeed is sharper than any two- 
edged sword and claims an ultimate and complete surrender in 
the very core and citadel of man’s being. God is a subject, the 
subject of all subjects; and accordingly Dr. Barth has no use for 
the traditional proofs of God’s existence, which treated God as 
if He were an object of human contemplation and speculation, 
the conclusion of some human inference. On all that Dr. 
Barth turns his back as upon what he calls, “the great tempta­
tion and source of error”, as “an abyss into which it is in­
advisable to step if one does not want to fall.”1 God is not an 
object but is supremely subject; and accordingly, if the 
traditional ‘proofs’ of God’s existence prove the existence of any 
being, that being, he would say, is not God, is not the one living 
and true God, the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, but in 
Pascal’s phrase, the god of philosophers and scholars.
This new emphasis in theology cannot be exclusively 
attributed to Dr. Barth, for undoubtedly the way was prepared 
for it, but it was certainly left to Dr. Barth to give it a most 
radical, and at the same time a most forceful, expression. 
Unfortunately in spite of its manifest power Dr. Barth’s express­
ion of it has been given a curious twist, due to his equally 
insistent contention that God is fundamentally Creator in relation 
to men and that man is a mere creature and nothing more, the 
end term as it were of God’s creative activity, his equally insistent 
contention in other words that God is everything and man 
nothing. But this contention, I am sure, is not only untrue but 
un-Biblical. The Bible knows nothing of a God who is first and 
last Creator in relation to man and that before everything else, 
so that men do not have even a relative and subordinate in­
dependence and so that by the sheer logic of his own theology
1N ein!„ t r a n s .  in  N a tu ra l T heology, 75.
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Dr. Barth is finally driven to affirm that such a human thing as 
sin is an ‘ontological impossibility’. This erroneous but quite 
fundamental contention of Dr. Barth’s that God is fundamentally 
Creator results in a number of defects in his theology, and, so 
far as the present argument is concerned, in two principal 
defects, for (i) Dr. Barth so emphasises the personal character, 
the subjectivity, if I may use that word without being misunder­
stood, the subjectivity of God that he has no room in his 
theology for an adequate recognition of the personal character, 
the subjectivity, of man, to which he is only able to pay lip- 
service now and again; and (ii) largely because this is so, he 
tends to regard the theological recognition of the subjectivity of 
God as if in the most absolute way it stood apart from, had no 
connection with, and could not contribute to, any philosophy 
whatsoever. To put these two points in other words, Dr. Barth 
represents man’s response to the revelation of God, that is, 
man’s faith, as if it were absolutely and in every way the 
creation of that revelation, the creation of the divine grace which 
is revealed, and consequently owed nothing to the man whose 
faith it is; and secondly, because this is the way of it, he regards 
genuine faith as something altogether apart from such a 
mundane and human activity as philosophy and therefore as 
prevented from making a contribution to philosophy.
These, I think, are very serious defects in this important 
movement in contemporary theology, and yet their source lies 
deeply embedded in the fundamental presuppositions of Dr. 
Barth’s thought. They have not, however, any essential 
connection with the genuinely profound insight that God is not 
an object of our thought but the supreme and sovereign subject 
in that intersubjective situation, which is the ultimately real 
situation and from which all other situations are abstractions; 
and not only does this insight, I think, constitute the real strength 
of Barthian theology but also when it acknowledges too the sub­
ordinate subjectivity of man, it points the way to an adequate 
system of thought, in contrast to the many one-sided systems 
which, with the major exception of Immanuel Kant’s, are almost 
all that the modern period has produced.
If this general contention is sound it means that although 
philosophy and theology are by no means identical they are 
closely related, and that the mutual indifference which is 
frequently to be found at present is quite misguided. So far as 
theology is concerned it means that in the performance of its 
own proper task, which no other discipline can perform for it, it
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both draws from philosophy and contributes to it. In particular, 
in the contemporary recognition of the personal dimension of 
human life and the human situation, these two disciplines share 
a most significant insight, an insight the significance of which it 
is difficult to over-estimate; and this insight is not the exclusive 
property of either philosophy or of theology, but is an insight of 
the human mind which works in both. If my contention is 
sound it means also that the work of theology is never done, 
that there is no such thing as a final theology. Theology is not 
a completed work but a task to which every new generation is 
summoned, a task which it must perform in the light of its own 
experiences and knowledge, since theology is inevitably concerned 
with faith and faith cannot be isolated from the other activities 
of man. It is God who is the same yesterday, today and for 
ever, God and His revelation of Himself in Jesus Christ His 
Son; but the task of understanding the revelation in theological 
terms is never at an end. This is not a welcome implication to 
an age which has shown its distrust of reason in many ways and 
its preference for arbitrary authority in one form or another; but 
to such an age John Oman’s question is pertinent in the highest 
degree, “Is the cause (of all our troubles) freedom itself or 
failure to rise to its responsibility?”1 And “this,” he rightly adds, 
“is our supreme question.” It was Oman’s supreme question 
to which he made several important contributions which in their 
very titles significantly underline it, Faith and Freedom, Vision 
and Authority, Grace and Personality. I am sure that it still 
remains the supreme question of the modern age and that part of 
the answer lies in the recognition that there is no final theology. 
But if there is no final theology there is no escape from the 
obligation to ensure that all our ultimate thinking, whether in 
philosophical or in explicitly theological terms, is on the right 
lines, and not least, I think, in relation to the dimension of the 
personal both human and divine. The modern period has seen 
many philosophies which had no conception of the personal in 
any form, and in recent years it has witnessed a theological 
revival which in striving to do justice, rightly and to its lasting 
credit, to the divine personality has somehow contrived to forget 
and violate the human. But, if I read my New Testament aright, 
it was not for nothing that God the Supreme Person sent His 
Son into the world, it was because He loved the world, it was 
because He loved the human persons whom He had made after 
His own image, that He gave His only begotten Son that 
whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have 
everlasting life.
1H on est R elig io n , 9.
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